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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Colton Merrill entered a plea agreement with the State whereby he pled guilty to a charge
of attempting to elude a police officer and admitted to violating his probation in two prior cases.
In exchange, the State promised to concur with the sentencing recommendations in the
presentence investigation report; the presentence investigator recommended retained jurisdiction
and a rider.
At sentencing, the prosecutor acknowledged the State’s obligation to follow the
presentence investigator’s recommendation, and he ultimately made the recommendation for
retained jurisdiction and a rider.  However, the prosecutor made additional, negative statements
regarding that recommendation, including “I think a straight prison recommendation is just
fantastic.”  (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-10) (Emphasis added).
The district court did not retain jurisdiction and sentenced Mr. Merrill to “straight prison”
in all three cases.  On appeal, Mr. Merrill challenges the dispositions in his three cases, which
have been consolidated for appeal, contending that the prosecutor’s negative statements at
sentencing constituted a breach of the plea agreement, and he asks for a new sentencing hearing
before a different judge.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr.  Merrill  has  struggled  with  heroin  addiction  for  years.   (PSI,  p.191.)   He  had  been
progressing in the Wood Drug Court program, as part of his probation in two previous cases, and
he had been sober for more than 15 months when, after a bad break up with his girlfriend, he
relapsed with a single heroin use.  (PSI, p.171.)  He became delusional and led police on a high-
speed car chase that ended when his vehicle left the road and landed in a canal.  (PSI, p.171;
2R., pp.305, 538.)  The State charged Mr. Merrill with attempting to elude a police officer and
driving without privileges, along with a persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.560, 562.)  The
State also filed probation violation reports alleging Mr. Merrill had violated probation in his two
previous cases.  (R., pp.301, 475.)
Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Mr. Merrill pled guilty to the eluding charge
and admitted violating his probation.  (R., p.573; Tr., p.16, L.5; Tr., p.19, L.21 – p.20, L.1.)  In
exchange, the State promised to dismiss the misdemeanor charge and to not pursue the
enhancement; the State also promised to concur with the recommendations of the presentence
investigation (“PSI”) writer.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.6-11, p.29, Ls.17-18.)  The PSI writer recommended
retained jurisdiction and a rider.  (PSI, p.177.)
At the combined sentencing and disposition hearing, Mr. Merrill asked the court to
continue his probation and allow him to participate in a new intensive residential treatment
program in the community; in the alternative, if the court were not to grant probation, he asked
for retained jurisdiction and a rider, as recommended in the PSI.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.)
The prosecutor then presented the State’s sentencing argument.  (Tr., p.29, L.16 – p.33,
L.4.)   The  prosecutor  acknowledged  he  was  bound  by  the  plea  agreement  to  follow  the  PSI’s
recommendation (Tr., p.29, Ls.16-18), and he ultimately made the required recommendation for
retained jurisdiction and a rider (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-16).  But the prosecutor also made additional
statements.  Referring to PSI writer’s recommendation, the prosecutor stated:
I don’t know if I have too much extra stuff in my eggnog1 or the presentence
investigator  writer  does,  but  what  the  conclusion  of  [the  PSI]  is  –  I  think  I  was
expecting to have an IDOC recommendation in this case.
(Tr., p.30, Ls.6-10.)
3The prosecutor went on to read from the presentence writer’s comments including:
Mr. Merrill has an extensive criminal history.  The instant offense is his third
felony.  He has completed a rider and had a chance to participate in a specialty
court.   He  has  had  previous  chances  at  probation  and  treatment  and  that,  along
with the nature of the instant offense, could merit a recommendation of
incarceration with the IDOC.
However, the fact the retained jurisdiction program has changed since he was last
sent on one is another option; therefore, I respectfully recommend a retained
jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.20, Ls.14-24.)
The prosecutor told the court he knew of “only two things” in favor of the
recommendation for retained jurisdiction:
Two things are this:  He “only” – and I say that with quotations.  He “only” did
the CAPP Rider, and he’s young.  That’s it.
I know we dealt with his mother in another court. She got another chance at
retained jurisdiction. … I think she got a third rider.
And he’s on the same path.  Mr. Merrill to me is on the same path of he comes to
court and says “This is what I’m doing.”  He does really great for a period of time
and then he’s back in the system.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.1-20.)  (Emphasis added.)
The prosecutor went on to make additional remarks about Mr. Merrill’s mother and
siblings and their frequent appearances on his criminal court calendar, stating:
I think a weak point is his mother and his siblings.  Maybe he just has the one
brother.  I don’t know if there’s more.
But since I’ve been here, it’s been that that group of people.  I’ve have a Merrill
on my calendar for four years at least once a month.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.5-7.)  Next, the prosecutor stated:
1 An apparent reference to the popular holiday drink that includes Bourbon; the sentencing
hearing took place on December 19th.
4So that’s how irritated I am by this, and that’s why I think a straight prison
recommendation is just fantastic.
But giving him the benefit of the doubt, I’ll turn my anger into a recommendation
of an underlying sentence of five years fixed [the maximum sentence].  I think
he’s earned it at this point.
And  now  the  ball  is  on  his  court,  and  I’ll  recommend  that  the  Court  order  a
retained jurisdiction and give him that one chance at the new program….
(Tr., p.32, Ls.2-12) (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Merrill did not object to the prosecutor’s comments.  (See generally Tr., p.32, L.11 –
p.44, L.6.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Merrill, in the 2016 eluding case, to a term of five
years, with two fixed, and revoked his probation in the 2013 and 2015 cases (Tr., p.39, Ls.5-24);
the court specifically declined to retain jurisdiction (Tr., p.41, Ls.10-12.).  Mr. Merrill timely
filed notices of appeal from the orders revoking his probation in his previous cases (R., pp.332,
505), and from the judgment imposing sentence in eluding case (R., p.597).2  Supreme Court
consolidated the appeals.  (See Order To Consolidate Appeals, dated February 21, 2017).
2 Mr.  Merrill  also  filed  a  Rule  35  motion  seeking  a  reduction  of  his  sentence,  and  the  district
court summarily denied it. (R., pp.503, 595, 613.)  Mr. Merrill’s appeal does not challenge the
denial of that motion.
5ISSUE
Did the State breach the plea agreement by making statements that were fundamentally at odds
with the sentencing dispositions that it was obligated to recommend?
6ARGUMENT
The State Breached The Plea Agreement By Making Statements That Were Fundamentally At
Odds With The Disposition That The State Was Obligated To Recommend
A. Introduction
When the State enters a plea agreement with a defendant promising to recommend a
particular disposition at sentencing, the prosecutor is not permitted to make statements
fundamentally at odds with that recommendation.  But that is exactly what happened here.
As  part  of  the  plea  bargain,  the  State  specifically  promised  to  concur  with  the
recommendation of the presentence investigation (“PSI”), which was for retained jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.6-11; PSI, p.177).  Although the prosecutor uttered the requisite words, he also made
a number of statements that were wholly incompatible with that recommendation:  he criticized
the recommendation and mocked the presentence investigator for making it; he listed reasons
that merited a counter recommendation for incarceration; he drew comparisons to another family
member’s failures after a second chance at rider, and remarked that “Mr. Merrill is on the same
path”; he pronounced his unqualified opposition to probation - which is the ultimate goal of
retained jurisdiction; and finally, but most blatantly, he told the court, “that’s why I think a
straight prison recommendation is just fantastic.”  (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-10, p.32, Ls.8-10.)
These statements were completely at odds with the recommendation for retained
jurisdiction, depriving Mr. Merrill of the benefit of his plea bargain, and constituted a breach of
the plea agreement as a matter of law.
7B. Standard Of Review
Mr. Merrill’s claim that the prosecutor’s additional statements breached the plea
agreement as a matter of law is reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with contract law
standards. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 256 (2012).
Although Mr. Merrill did not object to the prosecutor’s statements in the district court, his
claim  that  the  State  breached  the  plea  agreement  is  reviewable  by  this  Court  under  the Perry
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 255 (2012) (citing State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 225 (2010). Perry sets forth the applicable standard:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived  constitutional  rights  were  violated;  (2)  the  error  must  be  clear  or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it
must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
C. The State Breached Its Plea Agreement By Making Statements That Were Fundamentally
At Odds With The Disposition That It Was Obligated To Recommend
The law is well-settled that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled.” State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 255 (2012) (quoting
Santobello v. New York, U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971)). The State breaches its
agreement with a defendant when the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing is “so fundamentally
at odds with the position that the state was obligated to recommend that it amount[s] to a
violation of the agreement.” State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 617 (1995); see also State v.
8Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773 (2004); and State v.
Daubs, 140 Idaho 299 (Ct. App. 2004).
In Lankford, the State promised to recommend a lenient sentence in exchange for a plea
to murder.  127 Idaho at 617.  Although the prosecutor made that recommendation at sentencing,
he also presented aggravating evidence showing the defendant to be more culpable than he had
admitted, that he had been a disruptive inmate, and that he was a poor candidate for
rehabilitation. Id.  Additionally, the prosecutor argued that the defendant was highly culpable,
manipulative and dangerous. Id.  On appeal, this Court held that the State had violated the plea
agreement by making a presentation at sentencing that was inconsistent with its promise to
recommend leniency:
Allowing the state to make the arguments and introduce the evidence in
aggravation to the extent that was done was reversible error, because it was so
fundamentally at odds with  the  position  the  State  was  obligated  to  recommend
that it amounted to a violation of the agreement.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Jones, the prosecutor agreed to recommend retained jurisdiction in exchange
for the defendant’s guilty plea.  139 Idaho at 300.  However, while the prosecutor made the
requisite recommendation, she also argued to the district court that the presentence investigator
advised against supervised probation, in part, out of concern for the safety of the victims and
defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation. Id.  The prosecutor added that, while she was
bound to her recommendation, she did not have all of the aggravating information at the time of
the plea agreement and, thus, left it up to the court’s discretion. Id., at 300-01.  Applying
Lankford, the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that the additional statements made
by the prosecutor were “fundamentally at odds” with recommendation that the State had
promised; although the prosecutor uttered the requisite wording make the recommendation called
9for in the plea agreement, her additional statements “effectively disavowed the recommendation
for retained jurisdiction,” and thereby deprived the defendant of the benefit of his bargain,
constituting a breach of the agreement. Id. at 303.
Similarly, in State v. Wills, the prosecutor had agreed to recommend specific sentences,
but later argued that those sentences were “the very minimum” the court should impose, and that
the  State  was  showing  “great  restraint”  by  only  recommending  those  sentences.   140  Idaho  at
774.  The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s argument breached the plea agreement:
By presenting the recommended sentences as the minimum to be imposed and
indicating that this minimum recommendation was made with “great restraint,”
the  prosecutor  failed  to  endorse  the  recommended terms  as  the  ones  the  district
court should accept.  Instead, the prosecutor conveyed a reservation regarding the
advisability of imposing those sentences and implied that longer terms would be
more appropriate.   This conduct was fundamentally at odds with what the state
agreed to do under the plea agreement.
Id., at 776.
And in Daubs, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s argument was
“fundamentally at odds” with the terms of the plea agreement, where the prosecutor’s over-
emphasis of the harsher sentence recommended in the presentence investigation report acted as a
“constructive disavowal” of the State’s required recommendation.  140 Idaho at 301.
Federal appellate courts applying these same contract principles to plea agreements
likewise  hold  that  the  prosecutor  “may  not  superficially  abide  by  its  promise  to  recommend  a
particular sentence while also making statements that serve no practical purpose but to advocate
for a harsher one.” United State v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2012).  In Whitney the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
Although the sentencing recommendation need not be made enthusiastically,
when the government obligates itself to make a recommendation at the low of the
guidelines range, it may not introduce information that serves no purpose but to
influence the court to give a higher sentence. This prohibition precludes referring
to information that the court already has before it, including statements relating to
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the seriousness of the defendant’s prior record, statements indicating a preference
for a harsher sentence, or the introduction of evidence that is irrelevant to any
matter that the government is permitted to argue. Such statements are recognized
as introduced solely for the purpose of influencing the district court to sentence
the defendant more harshly.
673 F.3d at 971.  See also United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1233 (9th Cir. 2014) (the
prosecutor “breaches its bargain with the defendant if it purports to make the promised
recommendation while “ winking’ at the district court’ to impliedly request a different
outcome.”)
Like the prosecutors in these cases, the prosecutor in Mr. Merrill’s case uttered the
requisite words to recommend the disposition it was obligated to recommend.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-
17.)  However, and as in those cases, the prosecutor made additional comments throughout his
presentation that did not support the bargained-for recommendation; the prosecutor’s arguments
here argued against retained jurisdiction and in favor of a “straight prison.”  As discussed more
fully below, these additional statements were fundamentally at odds with the recommendation
the State was obliged to make, and violated the plea agreement.
1. The  Prosecutor’s  Statement  Mocking  The  Recommendation  Of  The  Presentence
Investigation,  Coupled  With  His  Statement  That  He  Had  Expected  A  Prison
Recommendation, Violated The Plea Agreement
After pointing out to the court that the plea agreement “bound us to follow the
recommendation of the PSI,” the prosecutor mocked that recommendation – and the presentence
investigator for making it – by stating “I don’t know if I have too much extra stuff in my eggnog
or the presentence investigator writer does,” and then, “I was expecting to have an IDOC [i.e.,
prison] recommendation in this case.”  (Tr., p.29, L.17 – p.30, L.10.)  By making these
statements, the prosecutor effectively told the court the recommendation made no sense to him
and that he thought it silly, and that the recommendation he had expected - IDOC incarceration -
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was the more sober disposition for this case.  These remarks served no practical purpose other
than to undermine value of the recommendation Mr. Merrill had bargained for, and violated the
plea agreement.
2. The Prosecutor’s Statements Minimized The Reasons For Retaining Jurisdiction,
And Emphasized The Reasons Against It, Violated The Plea Agreement
The prosecutor also told the district court he had personal, conflicting feelings about the
recommendation and decided to read aloud, from the presentence investigation, a list of reasons
supporting a prison sentence for Mr. Merrill:  his extensive criminal history, that the instant
offense is his third felony; that he had completed a rider and had a chance to participate in
specialty court; that he’d been given previous chances at probation and treatment; the serious
nature of the instant offense; and a conclusion that these reasons “could merit a recommendation
of incarceration with the IDOC.”  (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-20.)
This information was already before the district court in the PSI, and underscoring those
reasons could serve no practical purpose other than to influence the district court to consider
them in support of a straight prison sentence, and as such violated the plea agreement. See
Whitney, 673 F.3d at 971; Jones, 139 Idaho at 300.
Although the prosecutor also read the reason given by the presentence investigator for
recommending retained jurisdiction, i.e., there is a new retained jurisdiction program, (Tr., p.30,
Ls.14-24), the prosecutor went to great lengths to minimize the recommendation, stating there
were “only two things” that favored retained jurisdiction:  “[Mr. Merrill] ‘only’ – and I say that
with quotations, “only” did the CAPP Rider, and he’s young. That’s it.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.10-12.)
(Emphasis added.)  The prosecutor also made extensive, detailed comments regarding
Mr. Merrill’s record of failure, i.e., “he does really great for a period of time, and then he’s back
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in the system.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-20), clearly expressing his lack of confidence in Mr. Merrill’s
ability to succeed.  (See generally, Tr., p.31, L.3 – p.32, L.10.)
And, while the prosecutor did ultimately consent to recommend retained jurisdiction,
“giving him the benefit of the doubt,” and “give him that one chance” at a rider (Tr., p.32,
Ls.17), his additional comments showed that the prosecutor had strong reservations about the
recommendation, and were akin to the statement of “great restraint” that was held to violate the
State’s plea promise in State v. Wills. See 140 Idaho at 776.  Moreover, there is no exception to
the reasoning or holdings of Lankford, Jones, Wills, or Daubs that permits a prosecutor to present
a counter-argument to the recommendation the State is required to make under the plea
agreement.  Thus, although the prosecutor provided reasons that supported the recommendation,
he was not, consistent with the plea agreement, permitted to highlight reasons that were contrary
to that recommendation.
3. By Underscoring The Fact The Mr. Merrill’s Mother Was Given A Second
Chance On Retained Jurisdiction And Failed, And Then Telling The Court That
Mr. Merrill “Was On The Same Path,” The Prosecutor Breached The Plea
Agreement
The prosecutor additionally violated the plea agreement by pointing out that Mr. Merrill’s
mother had been given a second chance on retained jurisdiction and failed, and that he believed
Mr. Merrill was “on the same path”; the prosecutor emphasized his expectation of failure,
explaining that Mr. Merrill “does really great for a period of time, and then he’s back in the
system.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-20.) (Emphasis added.)  The prosecutor effectively argued the futility
of granting Mr. Merrill a second chance at retained jurisdiction, predicting that like his mother,
Mr. Merrill would fail.  This argument is incompatible with the State’s promise to recommend
retained jurisdiction, and violated the plea agreement.
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4. The  Prosecutor’s  Unqualified  Statements  Against  The  Possibility  Of  Probation
Are Incompatible With A Recommendation For Retained Jurisdiction
The  central  theme  of  the  prosecutor’s  argument  was  that  Mr.  Merrill  was  a  poor
candidate for rehabilitation and underserving of the “second chance” that was being
recommended.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-20.)  The prosecutor told the court that, “probation, for me, is out
of the question” and “there’s nothing in the last four years that I’ve seen here that tells me he’s
going to be okay on probation.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-7.)  As noted above, the prosecutor bolstered his
portrayal  of  Mr.  Merrill  by  telling  the  judge  that  Mr.  Merrill  was  “on  the  same  path”  as  his
mother, who was now on her “third rider,” explaining to the court that like her, “he does really
great for a period of time, and then he’s back in the system.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-20.) (Emphasis
added.)  These unqualified statements against even the possibility of probation are incompatible
with a recommendation for retained jurisdiction.  As recognized by Idaho’s courts, the primary
purpose of retaining jurisdiction is to afford the trial court additional time to evaluate a
defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673,
677 (Ct. App. 2005).  “Probation is the ultimate objective sought by a defendant who asks a court
to retain jurisdiction.” State v. Chapel, 687 P.2d 583 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).  Thus, a sentencing
recommendation for retained jurisdiction necessarily contemplates the possibility of probation.
Jones, at 677.
Here, the prosecutor’s statements constituted a forceful argument that Mr. Merrill would
never succeed on probation, regardless of any short-term success he may achieve.  (Tr., p.31,
Ls.3-20.)  Such statements are fundamentally at odds with a recommendation for retained
jurisdiction, since the ultimate goal is probation.  As such, these statements, too, violated the plea
agreement.
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5. The Prosecutor’s Statement, “That’s Why I Think A Straight Prison
Recommendation Is Just Fantastic” Violated The Plea Agreement
The most blatant of all of the violations, however, was the prosecutor’s statement, made
after describing his experience with Mr. Merrill:  “So that’s just how irritated I am by this, and
that’s why I think a straight prison recommendation is just fantastic.”  (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-10.)
(Emphasis added.)  This expression of a personal preference for prison cannot possibly be
reconciled with a recommendation for retained jurisdiction, and plainly violates the plea
agreement.
Moreover, and as discussed below, the fact that the prosecutor made this statement
negates any potential argument that his other adverse remarks were in response to the defense’s
request for reinstatement on probation. See State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161 (Ct. App. 2009)
(prosecutor’s argument detailing troubling facts and urging that a lesser sentence would
depreciate gravity of offense did not violate State’s plea promise to recommend relatively lenient
sentence, but was permissible as a buttress against defense’s argument for an even more lenient
sentence).
6.  The Prosecutor’s Additional Statements Cannot Be Justified As A Response To
The Defense’s Argument For Probation
Even if the prosecutor were permitted to present some argument in response to defense
counsel’s request for immediate reinstatement on probation, see Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 163,
the statements that the prosecutor made here cannot be justified.  The plea agreement restricted
the State’s sentencing argument, but not Mr. Merrill’s.  (See Tr., p.7, Ls.6-11, p.29, Ls.17-18.)
The fact that Mr. Merrill requested a disposition that differed from the one recommended in the
PSI  did  not  relieve  the  State  of  its  obligation  to  contour  its  sentencing  arguments  so  as  to  be
consistent with that recommendation.
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Consistent with its obligation to recommend retained jurisdiction, the prosecutor could,
for example, have stated that Mr. Merrill is not a suitable candidate for probation “at this time”
and then argued for retained jurisdiction and a rider.  Instead, the prosecutor chose to ridicule the
presentence investigator for his recommendation of retained jurisdiction; to portray Mr. Merrill
as unworthy of the “second chance” that was supposedly being recommended; and, finally, to tell
the court, explicitly, that he personally believes “a straight prison sentence is just fantastic.”
Although the prosecutor purported to justify some of his comments under the guise of
showing that Mr. Merrill lacked community support group (Tr., p.31, Ls.21-23), that explanation
cannot  justify  the  statements  that  Mr.  Merrill  challenges  in  this  appeal.   Those  statements
constituted an argument favoring “straight prison” and against retained jurisdiction, and were
entirely  at  odds  with  the  recommendation  that  the  State  had  promised  to  make,  constituting  a
breach of the plea agreement as a matter of law.
D.  Fundamental Error Under Perry Demonstrated
Mr. Merrill’s breach of plea agreement claim satisfies Perry’s fundamental error
requirements.
1. Violation Of Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has held, post-Perry,  that  a  claim  that  the  State  breached  a  plea
agreement “goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights.” State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho
253, 256 (2012) (internal citations omitted).  Applying Gomez here,  Mr.  Merrill’s  claim  of
breach, as established above, satisfies the first prong of the Perry standard. See Gomez, 153
Idaho at 256.
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2. Clear And Obvious Breach
Mr. Merrill’s claim of error likewise satisfies the second prong of the Perry test,  which
requires that the error be “clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision.”  150 Idaho at 226.
a. Terms Of The Plea Agreement Clear From The Record
The terms of the parties’ plea agreement, and the prosecutor’s conduct that breached that
agreement, are plain and obvious from the appellate record.  (See generally Transcripts of plea
hearing held 10/17/2016 and sentencing hearing held 12/19/2016; PSI, p.177); see also State v.
Jones, 139 Idaho at 301 (holding transcript of plea and sentencing proceedings adequate to
review claim that State breached its plea promise to recommend retained jurisdiction).
b. Failure To Object Not A Tactical Decision
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Merrill’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s improper statements was a tactical decision. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167
(Ct. App. 2011) (applying objective “reasonable trial strategist” standard to conclude that
information outside the record was not necessary to determine that the defendant’s failure to
object was not a strategic decision.)  Mr. Merrill had nothing to gain by allowing the prosecutor
to make disparaging remarks undermining the presentence investigator’s recommendation, or to
portray Mr. Merrill as an incorrigible criminal incapable of rehabilitation, or to express a
personal preference for a “straight prison.”  On the contrary, had he objected to these statements
in the district court, and prevented the prosecutor from making such a forceful argument for
incarceration, the court might have decided to follow the presentence investigator’s
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recommendation for retained jurisdiction.  Moreover, because Mr. Merrill’s alternative
recommendation was for immediate probation, an objection to the prosecutor’s advocacy for
straight prison would have been entirely consistent with Mr. Merrill’s strategic interests.
Applying an objective standard, there was no cognizable strategic advantage to Mr. Merrill for
failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper statements.
3. Substantial Rights Affected
Mr. Merrill’s claim also satisfies the third part of the fundamental error standard, which is
to demonstrate that the State’s breach of the plea agreement affected his substantial rights.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  Under this standard, Mr. Merrill must demonstrate “a reasonable
possibility” that the State’s breach affected the outcome of his sentencing. Id.; see also
Puckett v, United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), note 4 (“When the rights acquired by the
defendant relate to sentencing, the ‘outcome’ he must show to have been affected is his
sentence.”)
The presentence investigator’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction was a reasonable
disposition in this case.  Mr. Merrill had been battling a heroin addiction for years; he
successfully completed a previous rider and had made substantial progress in the Wood Court
program, nearly completing it; and he’d remained sober for fifteen months, until his recent,
single-use relapse triggered by a relationship breakup.  (PSI, pp.171, 191; Tr., p.33, Ls.17-18).
Mr. Merrill’s history of drug addiction, and his potential for overcoming that addiction, are
strong mitigating factors recognized by this Court. See State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171
(Ct. App. 2008).
Not only was retained jurisdiction a viable disposition, it was the disposition being
recommended to the court by the presentence investigator, who was an expert in such matters,
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and who was aligned with neither party.  (PSI, p.177.)  Pursuant to the plea agreement,
Mr. Merrill was entitled to the State’s unequivocal concurrence in that recommendation. While
not binding on the court, it is reasonably possible that the presentation of a “united front”3 would
have influenced the district court’s weighing process in favor retaining jurisdiction.
It is reasonably possible that the district court would have given some weight to the
State’s unequivocal recommendation for retained jurisdiction, had one been made; and it is
reasonably possible that the prosecutor’s breach, and the manner in which that breach occurred,
influenced the district court’s decision to not retain jurisdiction. See Whitney, 673 F.3d at 973-74
(applying plain error review to conclude there was a reasonable probability that government’s
breach in implicitly arguing for a higher sentence than the one it was obligated to recommend,
affected defendant’s substantial rights.)
After listening to the parties’ respective sentencing presentations, and after determining
the length of Mr.  Merrill’s underlying sentences and deciding to not place him on probation, the
district court squarely faced this issue: “So the question is whether I retain jurisdiction or impose
the sentence.”  (Tr., p.40, Ls.2-3.)  On this question, it is reasonably possible that the court would
have followed the presentence investigator’s recommendation for retained jurisdiction, had the
State not mocked and disavowed that recommendation, not portrayed Mr. Merrill as an
3As described by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the benefits to a defendant of
prosecutor’s promise to recommend a sentence is the presentation of a “united front” before the
sentencing court. See United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing “the persuasive force behind a sentencing recommendation when it is urged by the
government in addition to the defense”); see also United States v. Camarillo–Tello, 236 F.3d
1024, 1028 (9th Cir.2001) (“[W]hen the sentencing court hears that both sides believe a certain
sentence is appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances, this is more persuasive than only the
defendant arguing for that sentence”); see also United States v. Alcala-Sanchez, 666 F.3d 571,
575 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Camarillo–Tello).
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incorrigible criminal unworthy of a second rider, not argued against the very goal of retained
jurisdiction, and not expressed his personal preference for “straight prison.”
Given the extent of the prosecutor’s adverse commentary, the negative impact on the
court’s decision-making process is incalculable.  What is clear and obvious from this record,
however, is that the district court could have retained jurisdiction, but did not. And, given the
existence of factors that weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction, it was reasonably possible that
the presentation of a “united front” would have persuaded the court to retain jurisdiction, instead
of declining it.  The State’s breach deprived Mr. Merrill of that bargained-for united front,
affecting his substantial rights at sentencing.
E.  Remand Before A Different Sentencing Judge
The prosecutor’s breach of the plea agreement entitles Mr. Merrill to have his sentence
vacated and his case remanded to the district court, where he may obtain specific performance of
the plea agreement at a new sentencing hearing. McAmis v. State, 155 Idaho 796, 798 (Ct. App.
2013); Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 133. Although the breach was not the fault of the district court, the
case should be remanded to a different judge. See Jones, 139 Idaho at 303; McAmis, 155 Idaho
at 798.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Merrill respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
orders revoking probation and executing sentence in his 2013 and 2015 cases, vacate his
sentence in the 2016 eluding case, and remand his cases to the district court for resentencing
before a different judge.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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